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Abstract
Illegal sharing of cultural goods on the Internet has become a massive reality in today’s connected
society. Numerous studies have been performed to try and evaluate the impact of these practices on
the industry of cultural goods, and how much harm, if any, they have entailed. The effect of legal
and technical responses to limit pirating has also been investigated, showing in general inconclu-
sive effect. Instead of penalizing illegal actors - providers and/or consumers -, a totally different
approach has been proposed recently by the french government agency Hadopi. The idea is to offer
the possibility to sites that illegally share cultural goods to become legal in exchange of a retribution
proportional to their activity. The present work builds on parts of the elegant model proposed in
[1] to study the economic feasibility of such a scheme under various assumptions on the behaviour
of the different actors involved. Our main finding is that, supposing that more popular goods are
more prone to pirating, a retribution of the order of the increase in benefit per user gained by legal-
ized sites does indeed lead to a win-win situation for both producers/sellers of cultural goods and
willing-to-be-legalized sites.
1 Context
Digital cultural goods, including music, movies and books, have been subject to intense illegal circulation
over the Internet for more than fifteen years. Technologies used for this purpose have greatly evolved
over time, and nowadays a large array of possibilities are available. They include e.g. DDL, Streaming
or BitTorrent. Legal responses to reduce such practices have shown limited efficiency, in spite of a few
largely publicized cases. Legal actions targeting illegal providers are sometimes successful, but the long
list of services of different natures which were closed or modified due to such actions, which includes
e.g. Napster, Scour, Morpheus, Kazaa, Grokster, Limewire, BitTorrent, The Pirate Bay, Megaupload and
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Hotfile, shows that technology seems to always keep one step ahead of judicial responses. Even when
legal actions succeed in blocking an illegal offer and momentarily reduce pirate traffic, this one soon
recovers its pre-blocking level, as witnessed for instance by the case of Megaupload.
Directly targeting and suing consumers sometimes makes the headlines, but does not seem to be
more efficient, as this does not significantly modify the behaviour of pirate users in the medium term.
For instance, in France, the governmental agency Hadopi [2] has tried to enforce legal sharing at the
consumers’ level by implementing a mechanism called “gradual response”. As stated in [3], targeting
individual internet users is not likely to reverse the trend toward an online sharing culture, and there is
an urgent need for independent verification of claims of harm to the creative industries as a result of in-
dividual copyright. The second part of this statement raises an important question: independently of the
questionable efficiency of legal actions, it is not clear how illegal downloading affects legal consumption
of cultural goods. Indeed, despite a long list of informed works on the topic, there are no clear answers
to such questions as (1) whether consumer who have a significant use of illegal download have reduced
their legal consumption, (2) whether a notable proportion of illegal consumption would automatically
convert into legal consumption were pirate downloading made impossible, (3) whether pirate download-
ing fosters legal consumption in a measurable way by allowing consumers to get to know artists they
would not have come across otherwise. We refer the reader to the articles [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] (a
small sample of the available literature), some of which conclude that pirating does hurt in a significant
way the industry of cultural goods, while an equal number states that such an effect cannot be asserted.
We note that some of ideas of, for instance, [7, 12], are captured in the model proposed in [1], which is
our main source of inspiration.
Instead of pursuing this apparently endless play at cops and robbers between technology and copy-
right holders, one may seek alternative solutions that would respect the rights of authors and industry in
an era of massive digital exchange. A path that has been proposed in France in 2001 by ADAMI [13]
and SPEDIDAM [14] is based on the concept of a global license [15, 16]: the essential idea is to legal-
ize circulation of cultural goods in exchange for a fee on broadband internet subscriptions, either in a
“universal” fashion, that is, the fee applies to any individual possessing a broadband internet connection,
or optionally, where it would concern only users that intend to download cultural goods. Advantages
of such a license are that it avoids the complications related to suing pirates while providing a stable
revenue to artists and the industry. Drawbacks include the fact that legal issues related to this scheme
are not clear, as well as the difficulty to redistribute the money to artists in a fair way. Though global
license almost made it to be voted by the French Assembly, it was finally dismissed, but the idea is still
supported by various actors in France and around the world. Indeed, similar concepts have been pro-
posed under various denominations such as alternative compensation system, artistic freedom voucher
or non-commercial use levy in many countries including Australia, Canada, Germany, the UK and the
USA.
The aim of this work is to investigate another path to let producers of cultural goods recover some of
the retribution they are entitled to. The new and original idea, which has been proposed and is promoted
by the Hadopi, is to provide incentive for (some) illegal forums to become legal in exchange of a mon-
etary compensation, proportional to the amount of downloaded goods. In other words, the possibility
would be offered to forums to become legal provided they pay a contribution computed as a fraction
of the money they make from downloads. Such a scheme would be implemented by a public regula-
tion authority: indeed, one may argue that society would benefit from the legalization of forums both in
an immaterial way (a environment with less crime, more peaceful relations between forums and indus-
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try) and in a material one, with added fiscal incomes from industry revenue, or even avoiding extreme
negative externalities such as the collapse of parts of the industry if pirating gets out of control. Note
that, in a sense, this proposition is a sort of “global licence” with the twist that this fee is financed by
advertisement.
In order to study the economic feasibility of this proposition1, we set up a simple model for the
circulation of cultural goods and the financial fluxes it produces. Under some assumptions on the be-
haviour of consumers, we compute the profits of different actors such as the industry of cultural goods or
illegal/legalized forums, both in the current situation and in a framework where a proportional voluntary
retribution would be paid to industry by forums willing to become legal. This allows us to highlight
scenarios where both the industry and forums would financially benefit from such a shift. As is shown
below, a win-win situation does exist under the reasonable assumption that more popular goods are more
prone to pirating. A noteworthy fact is that, in the favourable case, the retribution will be of the order
of the increase in benefit per user gained by legalized sites: thus the industry will absorb all the benefit
coming from increased “price”, while forums will make more money from the fact that they will have
more users. See Sections 4.3 and 5 for more details.
The literature on economic models which evaluate in a quantitative way the effect of illegal download
is as rich as the one dealing with empirical studies, and it is by no means possible to list it extensively.
We content ourselves with mentioning that, besides [1], which is the starting point of our work, our
approach has some common features in particular with [11, 17, 18, 19], Less related works include,
among many others, [8] and Section 6.1 of [12], which use a welfare-theoretical approach, or [20], in
which an economy with two types of consumers with different willingness to pay is considered.
Despite the impressive number of articles that propose and study models for the interplay between
legal and illegal fluxes of cultural goods, and to the best of our knowledge, there is no structured work
that tries to assess the impact of policies aiming at reducing pirate downloading, whether these policies
are currently in use, such as legal suing of pirate sites or downloaders, or still discussed at governmental
level, such as the global licence or the proposition of Hadopi. Such studies are however needed in order
to assess the viability and efficiency of those responses, and to compare them in order to choose the most
adequate one. We hope that the current work is a first step in this direction.
The remaining of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our model in an ab-
stract setting: we formulate some general assumptions on the structure of the different sets of actors
(industry, consumers, forums, . . . ) in Section 2.1, which enable us to compute in Section 2.2 the profits,
depending on various relevant parameters such as for instance the price of the goods or the tendency for a
given consumer to resort to pirate downloading. This analysis provides general bounds on the retribution
that illegal forums would have to pay in exchange for legalisation. These bounds characterize the win-
win situations where each actor sees its profits increase. A particular case, termed “separable scenario”,
where the formula simplify greatly, is treated in Section 2.3. In order to compute numerically the bounds,
the parameters of the model must be estimated. A full study of this issue requires a considerable amount
of work that goes beyond the aims of the present article and will be performed elsewhere. Nevertheless,
we provide in Section 3 some rough but reasonable estimates of the parameters based on existing liter-
ature. Section 4 gives explicit computations using these estimates in three cases of interest describing
more precisely the structure of both the set of consumers and the one of cultural goods. These numerical
calculations allow us to determine the range of acceptable values for the retribution. Finally, Section 5
1we do not consider in this work technical or legal aspects. For legal aspects, see [25].
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briefly discusses our results and proposes some extensions to our simple model that are desirable to make
it more complete.
2 The model
2.1 General frame
Our model is an abstract and generalized version of a part of the one presented in [1], which deals with
the specific case of the music industry.
We consider cultural goods of a given type, e.g. music, movies or books. Four to six kind of actors
are involved:
1. the industry, which produces and sells the cultural goods;
2. consumers;
3. legal digital platforms, that propose physical or digital versions of the goods for purchase. In the
case of the musical or book industry, this corresponds for instance to Amazon.com or Fnac.com;
4. illegal forums for downloading digital versions of the goods.
In some instances (e.g. music), one or two more types of actors are present:
5. platforms providing free and legal streaming services and paying subscriptions. Typical examples
include Deezer or Spotify;
6. the artists.
In this preliminary study, only actors 1,2, and 4 are taken into account. In addition, for the sake of
simplicity, we consider a monopolistic situation for actor 1, so that we will speak of "the" industry I .
Before we detail the structure of the set of actors, let us mention that all the quantities defined below
are expressed in some abstract units whose exact meaning is irrelevant: indeed, in the end, we will char-
acterize situations where proportional retribution is economically feasible, and express this retribution as
a function of the “price” of cultural goods and the “earnings” of illegal forums.
Industry and cultural goods
We consider the situation at a given time T . The set G of cultural goods produced by industry at this
particular time is modelled as a countable set of points distributed on 2 N, the set of even integers2. Each
cultural good is identified with its coordinate on the positive real line. These coordinates are denoted
gi  2i, i  0, 1, . . . (i will always be used for indexing goods, so that a symbol like
°
i will mean that
the sum runs over all goods gi in G). All goods are assumed to be sold at the same price p.
Each good gi is characterized by its “attractiveness” ai, a real number in r0, 1s. The exact meaning
of attractiveness and the choice of its range will become clear below. In [1], attractiveness is chosen to
2This choice is purely for notational convenience; it helps avoiding unsightly formulas later.
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be of the form aqi, where the subjective “quality” qi perceived by consumers depends on the “effort” xi
put by industry to promote good gi in the following way:
qi  x
α
i , (1)
with α P p0, 1q (since quality increases less and less when promotional effort increases). We will have
no need of this expression below. Only the values of ai will matter.
Consumers
Consumers are distributed on the infinite strip r0, 1s  R. Each consumer C is characterized by its
coordinates pθ, xq, which are interpreted as follows:
• the distance ξ  ξpxq : dpC,Gq  infi |x  gi| measures the willingness of consumer Cpx, θq
to consume a good: the smallest dpC,Gq, the more the consumer is interested in the production.
Note that ξ P r0, 1s. In addition, each consumer buys or pirates only the good that is “closest” to
him at time T (or chooses the one with smallest coordinate if there are two such goods);
• the coordinate θ characterizes the behaviour of C as regards pirating. We assume that all goods
are available for free on illegal forums. In addition, following [1], we consider that pirating a
good translates into an immaterial cost for the consumer. This immaterial cost consists of two
components: a "comfort cost’, that incorporates at least the following elements: (a) a pirated good
will typically be of lower quality, (b) it may not be as easily accessible as the legal version, (c)
cover and other information, such as subtitles for films, may be unavailable, (d) downloading from
a forum generally requires some technical skills, (e) fear from computer viruses. The second
component is a "legal cost", that accounts for the fact that typical consumers prefer to remain legal
rather than facing the possibility of being prosecuted. Both costs are combined and their effect is
taken into account as follows: we assume that the immaterial cost may be written as θτ p, where
θ follows a distribution whose support is r0, 1s and τ is a real number in p0, 1q. The parameter θ
measures how reluctant a particular consumer is with regard to piracy: when θ   τ , the consumer
is willing to use illegal downloading, since its immaterial cost is smaller than industry cost p, while
values of θ larger than τ prevent piracy.
The behaviour of consumer C is described by the maximal amount w  wpxq that he is prepared
to pay to buy good gi, where i  ipxq is the element of G that is closest to him. [1] proposes that this
amount depends on attractiveness ai and on ξ as follows (we write i instead of ipxq for simplicity)3
w  ai  ξ. (2)
Each consumer is thus faced with three choices:
• if p   θτ p and p   w, then he will buy the good;
• if θτ p  minpp, θτ p, wq, then he will illegally download the good;
3In [1], a term tξ instead of ξ is considered in (2), where t is a positive real. As t is a just a fixed proportionality factor, it
may be incorporated into the distance ξ through an appropriate change of units.
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• if minpp, θτ p, wq  w, then he will pass.
These situations are equivalently characterized by the following conditions:
1. buy if τ   θ ¤ 1 and ξ   ai  p,
2. pirate if 0 ¤ θ   τ and ξ   ai  θτ p,
3. no consumption if ai minp1, θτ qp   ξ.
Note that case 1 is void whenever ai   p; likewise, case 2 is void if ai   θτ p.
As in [1], we assume that, when there is consumption, the consumer devotes a share 0 ¤ ρ ¤ 1 of
what he has left in consuming products related to the good he has bought or pirated4: this amounts to
ρpwpq in the case he has bought the good and to ρw if he used an illegal downloading site. From these
amounts, industry collects a fraction σ (where 0 ¤ σ ¤ ρ), that is σpw  pq when the good was bought
and σw when it was pirated.
The distribution of consumers on r0, 1s  R is described by a measure µ  µpdθ, dxq on this set.
We will mainly consider three configurations that seem to be of particular interest:
1. Configuration 1 is when µpdθ, dxq  µθpdθqµxpdxq with µθ uniform on r0, 1s and µx uniform
on r1, 2n   1s for some fixed positive integer n. More precisely, we set µθpdθq  dθ1tθPr0,1su
and µxpdxq  c dx2n 21txPr1,2n 1su, where c ¡ 0 is a constant which represents the total number
of consumers. In this model, consumers are thus only interested in the first n goods, and the
proportion of pirates is equal to τ . If one assumes in addition, as we will, that ai  a for all i, then
nothing depends on i: all goods are equally popular, and the proportion of consumers that will buy
or pirate gi is the same for all i. This is essentially the case considered in [1].
2. Configuration 2 takes again µpdθ, dxq  µθpdθqµxpdxq with µθ uniform on r0, 1s, but with µx
given by µxpdxq  c dx1 xγ , c ¡ 0, γ ¡ 0, and supported either on r0, 2n   1s if consumers are
only interested in the first n goods, or onR  if they are interested in a potentially infinite number of
goods (in which case one has to choose γ ¡ 1). This form serves as rough model for the situation
where there are a few popular goods with rapidly decreasing popularity, and "infinitely" many
goods with very low popularity. Such Pareto type distributions are often used for this purpose.
3. Configuration 3 is the most realistic one: it allows for a coupling between willingness to pi-
rate and popularity of a good. Assuming that more popular goods are more prone to pirat-
ing, we wish to design µ so that, for values of x such that µpdθ, dxq is large (i.e. the de-
sired good is popular), then there is more mass when θ close to 0 (i.e., the proportion of pi-
rates increases). Writing µpdθ, dxq  µxpdxq µθpdθ|xq, a simple choice is to set µθpdθ|xq 
p1 θqµxpdxqdx   1
µxpdxq
2dx
	
dθ, that is, the θmarginal density is a line with decreasing slope
equal to µxpdxqdx such that
³1
0 µθpdθ|xq  1 for all x. Simple computations show that, if µxpdxq is
chosen as in Configuration 2, then the proportion of pirates among consumers with first coordinate
4these can be live music, derived products for movies or video games, . . .
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between x and x  dx, that is
³τ
0 µθpdθ|xq³1
0 µθpdθ|xq
dx, is equal to τp2x
γ 3τq
2p1 xγq dx. For the most popular good,
i.e. when x  0, this is τp3τq2 , which is indeed larger than τ , the proportion of pirates for the
least popular goods (which corresponds to x Ñ 8). In general, our choice for µθpdθ|xq ensures
that, if the support of µx extends to infinity, then the limiting proportion of pirates when x tends to
infinity is exactly τ . Other, non linear, choices are of course possible.
Forums
We assume that there exist m forums F1, . . . , Fm, and that consumers that decide to use illegal
download choose at random one of the Fk with probability zk. Forum Fk (the index k will be reserved
for forums) is characterized by a parameter λk measuring its reluctance to accept the proposition of the
Hadopi. Indeed, some forums might agree to become legal under certain conditions, while others would
never do so (in that case, λ is infinite). Without loss of generality, we assume λ1 ¤ λ2 ¤ . . . ¤ λm. The
larger λ, the more reluctant is the forum to become legal.
We wish to model the revenue of illegal forums. A first very rough way to do so is as follows. Forums
earn money from advertisements. We assume that they get paid a fixed amount p˜ for each download
(although a more correct model would assume that they get paid for each unique visitor to their page).
The total profit PIF is then obtained by integrating over all pirate downloads.
Legalizing illegal forums could be performed by asking them to pay the industry a share of their
revenue. We choose a form ri  ripgiq ¡ 0 for each download of good gi for this contribution. Since
we assume that all goods are equally available on all forums, the contribution will essentially be equal
r 
°
i poppiqri, where poppiq is the normalized popularity of gi (normalized means that the sum of all
poppiq is one), Under the assumption of a uniform distribution of x, poppiq does not depend on i.
Forums that will agree to become legal are then those for which λk is smaller that a threshold λprq, a
function of the required contribution r. We let L denote the number of such forums, so that λL   λprq ¤
λL 1. A forum that becomes legal will typically attract more advertisements, and, more importantly,
from legal companies. This will likely increase the amount it gets paid for each download (visitor). We
denote this new amount by pˆ, with pˆ ¡ p˜.
For legal forums, there is no more a notion of pirating a good. Legalizing some forums would then
seem to imply that this form of consumption will kill both buying cultural goods and pirating them.
Indeed, consumers will have access for free to legal goods. This is however not the case. On the one
hand, a consumer downloading from a legalized forum is still faced with the comfort cost part of the
immaterial cost. This cost will make some consumers still reluctant to use forums, even though they are
legalized, and prefer to buy the good. We choose to model the comfort cost in a manner similar to the
one of the total immaterial cost of pirating, i.e. in the form θτˆ p. We choose τˆ in p0, 1q with τ   τˆ ¤ 1
since the cost is here less than for the one for pirating (the legal cost has been removed). On the other
hand, pirating will still occur, at least in a first phase for the following reason: if a consumer has a choice
of downloading the same good with the same features (quality, . . . ) either on a legalized forum or on
a pirate one, he will obviously choose the legalized forum (except in rare occasions that we choose to
ignore). This simply translates the fact that the cost θτˆ p is always smaller than
θ
τ p since τˆ ¡ τ . However,
as was assumed above, when searching for a cultural good, the consumer is redirected at random to one
of the m forums. In our model, a consumer thus never has a choice between a legalized and a pirate
forum: a proportion
°L
k1 zk of consumers will be redirected to a legalized forum, and thus will have
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Figure 1: Sets of buyers B, pirates P , and non-consumers for one good with attractiveness a.
a choice between (a) this kind of consumption, (b) buying, and (c) no consumption, while a proportion
1 
°L
k1 zk of consumers will have a choice between (a) pirating, (b) buying, and (c) no consumption.
It might be argued that, in time, the legalized offer will be better known and will attract more consumers.
This can be accounted for in our model by adjusting dynamically the probabilities pzkqk. We will assume
that, prior to legalization, all forums have equal probability of being chosen, i.e. zk  1{m for all k,
and that this remains the case for some time after legalization of the first L forums. This assumption is
justified by the fact that it will take some time before consumers get to be acquainted to this new form
of downloading and to adjust their practice. An extension to this work will examine the case where
z1, . . . , zL become in time larger than zL 1, . . . , zm.
After legalization, we thus have four non void classes of internet users : non-consumers, pirates,
downloaders from legalized forums, and buyers. We assume that the distribution µ does not change after
legalization: indeed, the preference of internet users as regards the goods, as encoded in the x variable,
has no reason to be altered, while their changed behaviour with respect to pirating is already taken into
account through the introduction of τˆ .
We now compute the profits of the different actors, prior to, and after legalization.
2.2 Computing profits
We shall make use of the following notations. B denotes the set of buyers, P the set of pirates and
C  B Y P the set of active consumers before legalization. After legalization of some forums, the set
of active consumers C is split as C  B Y D Y P where D is the subset of downloaders from legalized
forums, B and P are respectively the new sets of buyers and pirates after legalization. The sets C, C and
some of their subsets are pictured on Figures 1 to 3.
Let us express various measures and moments that will be needed in the sequel (for easy reference,
the meaning of all the parameters is recalled at the beginning of Section 3). First,
µpBq 
¸
i
» 1
τ
» 2i aip
2iai p
µpdθ, dxq, (3)
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Figure 2: Sets of buyers B, downloaders from a legalized forum D, and non-consumers for one good
with attractiveness a for individuals that were redirected to a legalized forum.
Figure 3: Sets C (gray) and C in the case of a legalized forum (gray + black) for a particular good with
attractiveness a.
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with the convention that any integral whose lower bound is not smaller than its upper bound is considered
to be 0 (remark also that the integrals with respect to x above are non-overlapping since ai ai 1 ¤ 2 ¤
2p  2). Likewise,
µpBq 

1
L
m


µpBq   L
m
¸
i
» 1
τˆ
» 2i aip
2iai p
µpdθ, dxq, (4)
µpPq 
¸
i
» τ
0
» 2i ai θτ p
2iai 
θ
τ
p
µpdθ, dxq, (5)
µpPq 

1
L
m


µpPq, (6)
µpDq  L
m
¸
i
» τˆ
0
» 2i ai θτˆ p
2iai 
θ
τˆ
p
µpdθ, dxq, (7)
»
B
w µpdθ, dxq 
¸
i
» 1
τ
» 2i aip
2iai p
pai  |x 2i|qµpdθ, dxq, (8)
»
B
w µpdθ, dxq 

1
L
m

»
B
w µpdθ, dxq  
L
m
¸
i
» 1
τˆ
» 2i aip
2iai p
pai  |x 2i|qµpdθ, dxq, (9)
»
P
w µpdθ, dxq 
¸
i
» τ
0
» 2i ai θτ p
2iai 
θ
τ
p
pai  |x 2i|qµpdθ, dxq, (10)
»
P
w µpdθ, dxq 

1
L
m

»
P
w µpdθ, dxq (11)
»
D
w µpdθ, dxq 
L
m
¸
i
» τˆ
0
» 2i ai θτˆ p
2iai 
θ
τˆ
p
pai  |x 2i|qµpdθ, dxq. (12)
The profit PI of industry prior to legalizing forums may be expressed as follows:
PI 
»
pupθ, ξqµpdθ, dxq KI

»
B
rp  σpw  pqs µpdθ, dxq  
»
P
σw µpdθ, dxq KI
 p1 σqpµpBq   σ
»
C
wµpdθ, dxq KI (13)
where pu is the profit per individual and KI denotes the global cost incurred by industry to produce and
promote all cultural goods.
Post-legalization industry profit reads:
PI 
»
B
rp  σpw  pqs µpdθ, dxq  
»
DYP
σw µpdθ, dxq   r µpDq KI
 p1 σqpµpBq   σ
»
C
wµpdθ, dxq   r µpDq KI . (14)
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The incurred gain or loss induced by legalization for industry is
PI  PI  p1 σqp
 
µpBq  µpBq  σ»
C
wµpdθ, dxq 
»
C
wµpdθ, dxq


  r µpDq. (15)
Using (3) to (12), one computes:
PI  PI  
L
m
¸
i
» τˆ
τ
» 2i aip
2iai p
rpp1  σq   σpai  |x 2i|qsµpdθ, dxq
  σ
L
m
¸
i
» τˆ
0
» 2i ai θτˆ p
2iai 
θ
τˆ p
pai  |x 2i|qµpdθ, dxq 
¸
i
» τ
0
» 2i ai θτ p
2iai 
θ
τ p
pai  |x 2i|qµpdθ, dxq

  r µpDq. (16)
PI PI is a sum of three terms. The one on the first line of (16) is non-positive since τˆ ¡ τ . The one on
the second line is also typically non-positive. Thus, industry profit will increase only if r is large enough,
which is intuitively obvious. Note that in the limiting case where τˆ  τ , industry profit increases by the
amount of r µpDq, as is expected.
Prior to legalization, profit of forum k, k  1, . . . ,m, is equal to
PFk 
1
m
»
P
p˜ dµ 
p˜
m
µpPq.
For k  1, . . . , L, profit after legalization becomes (recall that we assume equal probabilities zk, k 
1, . . . ,m)
PFk 
1
L
»
D
pˆ dµ
r
L
»
D
dµ 
pˆ r
L
µpDq,
while, for k  L  1, . . . ,m, the new profit reads
PFk 
1
m L
»
P
p˜ dµ 
p˜
m L
µpPq.
Thus, the shift in profit is
PFk  PFk 
pˆ r
L
µpDq  p˜
m
µpPq (17)
for k  1, . . . , L, and
PFk  PFk  p˜

µpPq
m L

µpPq
m


 0
for k  L   1, . . . ,m, where we have used (6). The fact that legalization has no impact on the profit
of forums that choose to remain illegal is simply a consequence of our assumption that the zk all remain
equal after legalization.
Legalizing forums will be profitable to industry whenever (15) is positive, and to forums as soon as
(17) is positive. This provides a range of values acceptable to both parties for the contribution r to be
paid by forums to industry:

1
µpDq

p1 σqp
 
µpBq  µpBq  σ»
C
wµpdθ, dxq 
»
C
wµpdθ, dxq



¤ r ¤ pˆ p˜
L
m
µpPq
µpDq .
(18)
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Inequalities (18) constitute our master formula, from which all the analysis below derives.
At first sight, it seems that the upper bound on r in (18) is a decreasing function of L, which would
be rather counter-intuitive. However, using (5) and (7), one sees that
pˆ p˜
L
m
µpPq
µpDq  pˆ p˜
°
i
³τ
0
³2i ai θτ p
2iai 
θ
τ
p
µpdθ, dxq
°
i
³τˆ
0
³2i ai θτˆ p
2iai 
θ
τˆ
p
µpdθ, dxq
, (19)
which shows that it depends neither on L nor on m. Inspection of (7) and (16) reveals that the lower
bound also does not depend on L nor on m.
Inequalities (18) are meaningful only if they define a non-empty interval in R , i.e. if
max

0, p1 σqp
 
µpBq  µpBq  σ»
C
wµpdθ, dxq 
»
C
wµpdθ, dxq



  pˆ µpDq  p˜ L
m
µpPq.
(20)
One checks that, in the limiting case τˆ  τ , µpPqm 
µpDq
L so that (18) becomes:
0 ¤ r ¤ pˆ p˜.
In other words, would there be no legal costs, the upper bound on the contribution r would simply be the
profit increase of legalized forums, a result which seems rather natural.
In the next section, we consider the special case where the measure µ is separable, a property that is
satisfied in Configurations 1, 2 described above. In this situation, the expression of the admissible range
for r as given by (18) simplifies significantly.
2.3 Separable scenario
In the case where µpdθ, dxq  hpxqgpθqdxdθ, and thus, in particular for Configurations 1 and 2, the
various integrals computed above, and, as a consequence, (18), take a simpler form. Note first that we
do not loose any generality in supposing then that g  1tθPr0,1su, since all we are interested in is the
proportion of individuals with θ   τ , where 0 ¤ τ ¤ 1. Replacing µpdθ, dxq by hpxqdxdθ and denoting
H a primitive of h, one computes
µpPq 
¸
i
» τ
0
» 2i ai θτ p
2iai 
θ
τ
p
hpxq dx dθ

¸
i
» τ
0

Hp2i  ai 
θ
τ
pq Hp2i ai  
θ
τ
pq


dθ
 τ
¸
i
» 1
0
pHp2i  ai  θpq Hp2i ai   θpqq dθ
 τISppq,
where we have set ISppq :
°
i
³1
0 pHp2i  ai  θpq Hp2i ai   θpqq dθ. The same computations
lead to
µpDq  L
m
τˆ ISppq,
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so that the upper bound in (18) now just reads pˆ
τ
τˆ
p˜. The lower bound does not simplify so drastically,
but one can compute
µpBq 
¸
i
» 1
τ
» 2i aip
2iai p
hpxq dx dθ
 p1 τq
¸
i
pHp2i  ai  pq Hp2i ai   pqq
 p1 τqSppq,
where Sppq :
°
i pHp2i  ai  pq Hp2i ai   pqq. Likewise,
µpBq 

1
L
m


p1 τq  
L
m
p1 τˆq


Sppq.
Let Hˇi denote a primitive of the function x ÞÑ pai  |x 2i|qhpxq. Then»
B
wµpdθ, dxq 
¸
i
» 1
τ
» 2i aip
2iai p
pai  |x 2i|qhpxq dx dθ
 p1 τq
¸
i
 
Hˇip2i  ai  pq  Hˇip2i ai   pq

 p1 τqSˇppq,
where Sˇppq 
°
i
 
Hˇip2i  ai  pq  Hˇip2i ai   pq

. One obtains in the same way»
B
wµpdθ, dxq 

1
L
m


p1 τq  
L
m
p1 τˆq


Sˇppq,
»
P
wµpdθ, dxq 
¸
i
» τ
0
» 2i ai θτ p
2iai 
θ
τ
p
pai  |x 2i|qhpxq dx dθ
 τ
¸
i
» 1
0
 
Hˇip2i  ai  θpq  Hˇip2i ai   θpq

dθ
 τ|ISppq,
where we have set |ISppq : °i ³10  Hˇip2i  ai  θpq  Hˇip2i ai   θpq dθ, and finally»
D
wµpdθ, dxq 
L
m
τˆ|ISppq.
Gathering the above expressions, one sees that, in the separable case, (18) reads
1
τ
τˆ
	 p1 σqSppq   σpSˇppq  |ISppqq
ISppq
¤ r ¤ pˆ
τ
τˆ
p˜. (21)
These bounds will be used in the next section in the cases of Configurations 1 and 2.
We note the remarkable fact that the upper bound does not depend on µ: when the reluctance for
pirating is independent from the popularity of the goods, the distribution of consumers has no effect on
fixing the upper limit for the contribution r.
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3 Parameter estimation
In order to put our model to work and obtain meaningful numerical results, we need to set its parameters
to realistic values. For the reader’s convenience, we recall here the full set of the twelve parameters
defined above, with some comments related to their practical use:
1. c : constant proportional to the total number internet users, that is, buyers + pirate downloaders
+ non-consumers. One easily sees from (21) that the bounds do not depend on c in the separable
case, and thus we may ignore it when dealing with Configurations 1 and 2. It does however play
an important role in Configuration 3, as we shall see below.
2. n: number of cultural goods of a given type (music, movies, series, . . . ) that generate “significant”
traffic on the internet. In separable scenarios, the bounds do not depend on n.
3. ai: attractiveness of good gi. It does not seem easy at this time to estimate the full collection
of ai, and we will assume that ai  a for all i, that is, attractiveness does not depend on the
good. Although a simplifying assumption, this still allows us to get an idea of the feasibility of the
proposal; in separable configurations, only the lower bound in (18) depends on a.
4. p: industry price of a good. Again, in separable configurations, only the lower bound depends on
p;
5. τ : parameter measuring the total cost of pirating, that is, the comfort cost plus the legal cost. In
separable scenarios, τ is just the proportion of pirate downloaders. In general, this is still true in
most cases of interests provided n is very large;
6. τˆ : parameter measuring the comfort cost of pirating, that is, the reluctance to download from
legalized forums;
7. σ: factor that governs the industry share of the proportion of what consumers spend for products
related to the good they either buy or download illegally. Only the lower bound in (18) depends on
σ, and it does so in an affine way;
8. m: total number of pirate forums before legalization, or of pirate +legalized forums after legaliza-
tion. Formula (18) shows that the bounds do not depend on m;
9. L: number of legalized forums. Formula (18) shows that the bounds do not depend on L;
10. p˜: remuneration of pirate forums. Only the upper bound in (18) depends on p˜;
11. pˆ: remuneration of legalized forums. Only the upper bound in (18) depends on pˆ;
12. γ: factor characterizing the speed of decay of the popularity of goods in Configurations 2 and 3.
Recall finally that r denotes the retribution that will be asked to illegal forums in exchange for legaliza-
tion.
As one can see, the set of the ten parameters that needs to be estimated is tc, n, a, p, τ, τˆ , σ, p˜, pˆ, γu
(although not all parameters are relevant in each situation). This is not an easy task, as most of them
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are not directly observable. A full calibration requires a work of its own and it will be the topic of a
subsequent study. For the current work, we adopt the following strategy: for each parameter, we set
a sensible default value, estimated from various sources as explained below. In order to appreciate the
impact of each parameter and what would happen if our estimations were significantly wrong, we let
each parameter vary in its natural range while keeping the other ones fixed to their default value. That
is, we draw below curves describing the evolutions of the lower and upper bounds in (18) separately as
functions of each of the parameters. This allows us to recognize for which values proportional retribution
will make economical sense.
We now comment on the way each default value is set. We mainly use the following sources:
• [21] is a study made by the Hadopi in June 2013. One aim of the Hadopi was to monitor the usage
of Internet in France as concerns the circulation of cultural goods. In that view, the Hadopi has set
up a large scale investigation to obtain data based on consumption logs filled by voluntary users.
More precisely, users had to record on a daily basis their digital consumption of music, movies,
series, video games and books/comics over a period of seven consecutive days. The investigation
involved 4,740 individuals.
• [22] is another study performed by the Hadopi in September and October 2012, based on an investi-
gation on 1,530 internet users of age at least fifteen chosen from the Survey Sampling International
panel.
• [12] discusses the findings of a representative survey of 1,500 Dutch internet users in 2009, who
were asked about their behaviour in relation to file sharing of music, films and games with the aim
of identifying the economic and cultural effects of file sharing.
• [23] is a vast survey of practices regarding copying and downloading conducted in August and
September 2011 based on a random phone survey of 1,000 Germans and 2,303 Americans.
• the web facilities CEG TEK International and Torrent Freak.
Based on these sources, we estimate the default values as follows:
1. c: as mentioned above, we need only consider c in the frame of Configuration 3. A Taylor expan-
sion of the integral of µpdx, dθq over r0, 2n  1s  r0, 1s when n tends to infinity, with γ  0.41
(see item 8 below), yields that the total mass, that is, the number of internet users, is of the order of
2.53 c n3{5. With n  500 (see item 2 below), this amounts to 105 c. The number of internet users
in France is estimated to be around 43.2 million (for comparison, p. 81 of [12] gives an estimate
of 10.7 million users in the Netherlands). We thus take c  400, 000 as a reasonable value. Note
that one could consider instead the total estimated number of internet users throughout the world -
which is of the order of 2,900 million - to set the value of c. A look at the graphs in the next section
shows however that both bounds quickly reach an asymptotic value well before c  400, 000.
2. n: while it is hard to set a definite limit on the numbers of cultural goods of a given type (music,
movies, series, . . . ) that generate significant traffic, a look at http://www.cegtek.com/
afm/ reveals that 500 is probably a sensible figure.
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3. a, p, τ : we estimate jointly these parameters by taking advantage of the fact that the measures µ
of the set of non-consumers, buyers, and pirates are all functions of the triplet pa, p, τq and of no
other parameters. More precisely, writing NC for the set of non-consumers, easy computations
reveal that, in Configuration 1 with c  1 (recall Figure 1),$'&
'%
µpNCq  p1 τqpp1 a  pq   τp1 aq   pτ2 ,
µpBq  p1 τqpa pq,
µpPq  τpa pq   pτ2 .
(22)
This is a set of three non-linear equations in the unknowns pa, p, τq, which have multiple solutions.
Relevant ones may then be searched for once µpNCq, µpBq and µpPq are known5. The figures on
p. 26 of [21] are useful for this purpose. They indicate that sensible (normalized) values, e.g. in
the case of music, are µpNCq  0.48, µpBq  0.66 0.52  0.3432, and µpPq  0.34 0.52 
0.1768. Slightly different figures would be obtained if one considered other types of cultural good,
or all cultural goods. For instance, µpNCq drops down to 0.32 if one considers all types of cultural
goods. We neglect these variations as our aim here is to obtain a general behaviour, and also
because precision at this stage is not meaningful since several parameters are unreachable at this
time. We note also that our estimates are comparable with the ones obtained for various countries
in [23].
To decide which solutions of (22) are most relevant, we use two more facts from our sources: first,
p. 106 of [12] hints that the value of a  ξ averaged over all consumers should be close to 0.6p.
Since, in Configuration 1, this average is simply a  12 , we expect that a should not be too far
from 0.5   0.6p. This estimate is also consistent with figures given p. 78,79 and 82 of [12] and
roughly consistent with the ones on p. 59 of [23] and with findings in [8]. Second, all our first four
sources indicate that τ should be somewhere between 0.2 and 0.7, depending for instance on the
type of cultural good - music, films, series- (see for instance p. 26 to 29 of [21] or p.19 of [23]).
Solving (22) with the constraints that a P r0.5, 1s, p P r0, 0.5s and τ P r0.2, 0.7s yields the solution
pa  0.72, p  0.23, τ  0.29q.
A value of 0.29 for τ might seem underestimated. However, one must recall that, in our model,
individuals are divided into three non-overlapping classes: non-consumers, buyers, and pirates.
Thus, the value of τ represents the percentage of individuals that will typically both consume
digitally a cultural good and do it in an illegal way.
Note that the values of pa, p, τq above have been derived for Configuration 1. Clearly, Formulas
(22) are different in other configurations. We will however stick to these values as sensible default
ones in all cases.
4. τˆ : the figures on p.23 of [22] suggest that setting τˆ  2τ  0.58 is a relevant choice.
5. σ: this parameter is difficult to estimate. However, since only the lower bound in (18) depends on
σ, and since it does so simply in an affine way, its impact is not crucial. Setting σ  0.1 does not
seem to be unreasonable.
5Note that knowledge of these three quantities is not enough to determine the bounds in (18) since moments of µ are also
required.
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6. p˜: we have found no reliable source to set the value of this parameter. We have settled on p˜ 
0.1p  0.023.
7. pˆ: this is even more difficult to estimate, as it refers to a hypothetical situation. We believe that
taking pˆ  0.2p  0.046 may be appropriate. See Section 4.3 for a discussion on this aspect.
8. γ: the decay rate may be roughly estimated for instance from the figures given at http://
torrentfreak.com/game-of-thrones-most-pirated-tv-show-of-2013-131225/,
which exhibit a rather good linear fit between the logarithm of the rank and the one of the number
of BitTorrent downloads for series, with slope close to γ  0.41 (see Figure 4). As our experiments
show, the bounds are only slightly sensitive to a change of γ.
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Figure 4: Log-log plot of downloads versus rank for the ten top most downloaded series on BitTorrent in
2013.
To sum up, we will use the parameters displayed in Table 1 (not all parameters are relevant in each
case). Obviously, these values are only approximations, as only indirect sources are available at this time
to estimate them. In addition, we have several times taken average between values that would fit either for
music, films, or series, rather that performing distinct estimations for each type of cultural good: while
the latter procedure would clearly be more correct, we lack at this time sufficient data to go to this level of
detail. We believe nevertheless that our default values provide sensible starting points. This statement is
supported by the fact that the values we have derived roughly fit the situation in many countries including
France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA. Finally, we note that inspection of (18) shows
that both our bounds are smooth functions of the parameters: as a consequence, small inaccuracies in
their estimation do not alter qualitatively our results.
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c n σ a p p˜ pˆ τ τˆ γ
400,000 500 0.1 0.72 0.23 0.023 0.046 0.29 0.58 0.41
Table 1: Default values used for the parameters in numerical experiments.
4 Numerical computations
Equipped with the estimates of the previous section, we now proceed to compute the bounds of (18) on
the three configurations described earlier. As explained above, we let the parameters vary one at a time,
letting all the other ones taking the default values indicated in Table 1. This procedure yields curves,
or, rather, strips, characterizing the possible win-win situations when they exist, that is, the cases where
both industry and forums benefit from legalization, along with the corresponding admissible values for
the contribution r.
4.1 Configuration 1
Recall that, for Configuration 1, the bounds in (21) do not depend on c nor on n. Obviously, γ is also
irrelevant here, which leaves us with seven parameters to be varied. Figures 5 to 11 display graphs
showing the evolution of the bounds as functions of the remaining parameters, that is, σ, a, p, p˜, pˆ, τ, τˆ .
The figures show that, when µ is uniform, the estimated values for the parameters are such that the
proposition of the Hadopi is not economically feasible. A retribution r would exist only if:
• σ was larger than 0.55, which means that Industry would gather more than half of what consumers
spend for cultural products they have bought or pirated (aside from p). As mentioned above,
estimating σ is a difficult task, and our default value 0.1 may well be underestimated. However, a
value of 0.55 seems unrealistic.
• a was smaller that 0.3, a value that is quite far from our estimate of 0.72 and rather close to the
default one of 0.23 of p. Symmetrically, a value of r would exist if p was larger that 0.67 and close
to the default value of a. In other words, Industry price has to be large enough for the proposition
to be applicable.
• The earning of legalized forums pˆ was larger that 0.1, which means that it would have to be
multiplied by four after legalization assuming that p˜  0.023.
• the proportion of pirates τ was larger than 0.5. This might be not totally unrealistic.
• The proportion of users downloading from legalized forum was smaller than 0.33: at least in a first
phase, such a figure would be possible. However, in time, one would expect that τˆ would become
significantly larger than τ  0.29.
Note also that no reasonable values of p˜ leads to a feasible scenario.
Summing up, we see that, for a retribution r to exist in Configuration 1, the values of the parameters
would have to be significantly different from the default ones. Since some of our estimates are rather
imprecise, it may be the case that the proposition of Hadopi is feasible under a uniform distribution, but
it is more probable that it is not so.
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Figure 5: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (21) as functions of σ in Configuration 1. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
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Figure 6: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (21) as functions of a in Configuration 1. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
19
0 .1 0 .2 0 .3 0 .4 0 .5 0 .6 0 .7 0 .8
p
− 0 .0 2
0 .0 0
0 .0 2
0 .0 4
0 .0 6
0 .0 8
0 .1 0
0 .1 2
b
o
u
n
d
s
Lowe r (re d ) a n d  u p p e r (b lu e ) b ou n d s  a s  fu n ct ion s  of p , Con fig u ra t ion  1
Figure 7: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (21) as functions of p in Configuration 1. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
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Figure 8: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (21) as functions of p˜ in Configuration 1. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
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Figure 9: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (21) as functions of pˆ in Configuration 1. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
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Figure 10: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (21) as functions of τ in Configuration 1. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
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Figure 11: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (21) as functions of τˆ in Configuration 1. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
4.2 Configuration 2
As already noted, (21) shows that the upper bound is the same for Configurations 1 and 2. Our numerical
experiments further indicate that the lower bounds in Configuration 2 are very close to the ones in Con-
figuration 1 when all the parameters σ, a, p, p˜, pˆ, τ, τˆ are varied in their admissible ranges: the difference
is of the order of 105. For this reason, we do not present the graphs corresponding to these parameters.
Maybe more surprisingly, the lower bound in Configuration 2, which depends on γ, has negligible
discrepancy with the lower bound in Configuration 1 with default parameters when γ   1. The difference
increases with γ, but it only reaches 0.001 when γ  2. Figure 12 displays the bounds as functions of γ
in Configuration 2 (of course, only the lower bound varies with γ).
These facts may be an indication that our model is robust with respect to a change of distribution of
consumers in the class of separable measures. It also reveals that, if the behaviour of internet users as
regards pirating does not depend on the popularity of goods, the proposition of the Hadopi is likely to be
economically infeasible.
4.3 Configuration 3
Assuming the same form for the distribution in x as in Configuration 2, we set in this section
µpdθ, dxq 

1 
c
1  xγ

1
2
 θ



dθdx.
We draw on Figure 13 an example of the ruled surface which is the graph of the density of the
measure. Note that, in this configuration, the bounds in (18) do depend on all our ten parameters.
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Figure 12: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (21) as functions of γ in Configuration 2. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
Figure 13: The density of the measure in Configuration 3 when γ  2.
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We display our results on Figures 14 to 23. One sees that, in this configuration, the default values lead
to a non-empty interval for the retribution r, so that the proposition of the Hadopi is indeed economically
feasible: r would be of the order of 0.025, that is, roughly comparable to the remuneration of pirate
forums. At first sight, this result might seems counter-intuitive: pirate forums earn p˜ per download, while
legalized ones earn pˆ  2p˜ with our default values. With a value of r  p˜, one has that pˆ r  p˜, so that
there is nothing to gain for forums through legalization: the increase in profit serves as the retribution to
Industry. However, one must recall that, after legalization, these forums will attract (significantly) more
users since τˆ  2τ , so that their total earning will become much larger. In other words, the net profit per
download would not change, but the volume will increase. The fact that the per-download increase in
profit of legalized forums will essentially go to Industry is noteworthy: it reveals the mechanism through
which the proposition of the Hadopi will function.
Our graphs indicate that these results are rather robust with respect to changes in the parameters:
in most cases, the lower bound remains smaller than the upper bound throughout the whole admissible
range of the parameter. The exceptions are τ and the couple pp˜, pˆq: too small a proportion of pirates prior
to legalization (that is, in the current situation) would not allow for r to exist. Given that our estimate for
τ is probably a lower bound, this is not likely to be the case. The other problematic situation is when the
increase in the earnings of forums before and after legalization is too small: legalization should allow the
profit per download to be multiplied by at least 1.5. While this does not seem unreasonable, verifying
whether this assumption is realistic should be the topic of further studies.
To sum up, even if our estimates are strongly in error (except for an overestimation of pˆp˜ , which,
admittedly, is hard to evaluate), a range of possible values for r does exist. As a consequence, the
proposition of the Hadopi seems to make economical sense if one believes that more popular goods are
more prone to pirating.
5 Discussion and extensions
The numerical results of the preceding section show that proportional retribution may be economically
feasible provided it is true that the tendency to use pirate download depends on the popularity of goods.
More precisely, we need to assume that popular goods are more prone to pirating. This does not seem
unreasonable, and is probably closer to reality that the separable scenarios of Configurations 1 and 2
where internet users do not adjust their behaviour based on what they wish to consume.
In this frame, our findings show that a retribution in exchange of legalization, that would be of the
order of the current profit of pirate forums, would allow to augment the earnings of both Industry and
legalized forums, under the two conditions that the proportion of pirates is large enough (which seems
largely true) and that the increase in the amount of money that forums will make from advertisement
when becoming legal is sufficient. We note the interesting fact that this increase will essentially be used
for the retribution to Industry, while the gains for forums will come from the fact that they will attract a
larger number of consumers.
Economic feasibility is of course but one aspect of the proposition put forward by Hadopi. Legal
and technical matters are of equal importance. Finding an adequate legal frame is a challenge, specially
since many rights, including fundamental ones such as intellectual property, are involved. As mentioned
above, the proposition can be seen as an instance of global licence analogous to [15, 16] with the twist
that this fee is financed by advertisement. Another way to see it is to realize that it proposes a sort of low-
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Figure 14: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (18) as functions of c in Configuration 3. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
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Figure 15: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (18) as functions of n in Configuration 3. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
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Figure 16: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (18) as functions of σ in Configuration 3. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
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Figure 17: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (18) as functions of a in Configuration 3. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
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Figure 18: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (18) as functions of p in Configuration 3. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
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Figure 19: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (18) as functions of p˜ in Configuration 3. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
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Figure 20: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (18) as functions of pˆ in Configuration 3. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
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Figure 21: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (18) as functions of τ in Configuration 3. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
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Figure 22: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (18) as functions of τˆ in Configuration 3. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
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Figure 23: Lower bound (red) and upper bound (blue) in (18) as functions of γ in Configuration 3. The
vertical black dashed line indicates the default value.
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cost legal alternative to acquiring cultural goods: consumers that are not prepared to pay the monetary
price p for a good g may still legally enjoy a lesser quality version of g at the non-monetary price of
some technical skills through legalized forums. Such a paradigm raises a number of important legal
issues [25].
Technical aspects are also difficult to deal with. Establishing communication and dealing with pirate
sites, and then controlling the behaviour of the ones entering in the legalisation process will not be easily
achieved. A point must be taken into account that may threaten the whole paradigm: that pirate sites
do not conform with the legal system does not mean that they do not obey any rules. To the contrary,
as stated in [24], the emergence of voluntary IP regimes in piratical communities is an important signal
that even if they have little respect for statutory copyright or are unwilling to honor every claim made by
rights-holders, those millions who engage in piratical practices are well aware of their responsibilities
as members of a cultural community. Their decisions, however, are less based on laws, and more defined
by the ethics negotiated within the community. In other words, even though an offer for legalization may
be advantageous to most pirate sites, at least some of them will not accept it because it does not fit in
their vision of the sharing of cultural goods on the internet.
The version of our model studied above is rather minimal. One needs to extend it in a variety of
directions, including the following ones:
1. introduce actors 3, 5 and 6 to obtain a more complete and realistic view of the implications of
legalizing some pirate forums;
2. model the increase of the probabilities pzkqk¤L and deduce the corresponding variations of profits
for all actors;
3. it seems natural to assume that all goods are not available at all times from forums. Instead, more
popular ones will be more likely to be available. Thus, a more realistic model will attach to each
good gi a probability of being available which is directly proportional to its popularity;
4. consider more general forms for the contribution paid to industry by forums willing to become
legal;
5. consider in greater details the specific cases of the music and film industries.
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